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Abstract—We consider in this paper the analysis of a large
set of malware and benign applications from the Android
ecosystem. Although a large body of research work has dealt
with Android malware over the last years, none has addressed
it from a forensic point of view.
After collecting over 500 000 applications from user markets
and research repositories, we perform an analysis that yields
precious insights on the writing process of Android malware.
This study also explores some strange artifacts in the datasets,
and the divergent capabilities of state-of-the-art antivirus to
recognize/deﬁne malware. We further highlight some major
weak usage and misunderstanding of Android security by
the criminal community and show some patterns in their
operational ﬂow. Finally, using insights from this analysis, we
build a naive malware detection scheme that could complement
existing anti virus software.
Keywords-Android Security, Digital Forensics, Malware
Analysis, Malware development
I. INTRODUCTION
Android has progressively grown to become in a few
years the most widely used smartphone operating system [6].
With more and more users relying on Android-enabled
handheld device, and able to install third party applications
from ofﬁcial and alternative markets, the security of both
devices and the underlying network becomes an essential
concern for both the end user and his service provider. In
recent years, practitioners and researchers have witnessed the
emergence of a variety of Android malware. The associated
threats range from simple user tracking and disclosure of
personal information to advanced fraud and premium-rate
SMS services subscription, or even unwarranted involvement
in botnets. Although most users are nowadays aware that
personal computers can and will be attacked by malware,
very few realize that their smartphone is prone to an equally
dangerous threat.
To assess the threat of software downloaded from the
internet, discerning users rely on scan results yielded by
antivirus products. Unfortunately, each antivirus vendor has
its secret recipe on how/why it decides to assign a malware
label to a given application. Thus, an application can be
differently appreciated by distinct antivirus products, leading
to damaging confusions. Indeed, both practitioners and
researchers heavily rely on antivirus, whether to trust apps
or to build the ground truths for assessment tasks.
For the purpose of our study, we have collected a large
and up-to-date dataset of hundreds of thousands of Android
applications from markets and repositories. We have then
scanned each of these applications using about 45 antivirus
products generously hosted by VirusTotal to assess whether
they are labelled as malware or not. This effort was made to
obtain a clear view of the business of malware writing and
some insights in the evolution of malware and its detection
by antivirus products. We also take this opportunity to
investigate, indirectly, how skilled malware creators are.
Several research studies have investigated Android
malware [1], [8], [23], [24]. Most of these academic works
are however about using advanced code analysis and data
mining techniques to study applications. Thus, there are
scarce reports on the actual artefacts that a typical incident
responder would rely on in practice. Our study aims at ﬁlling
this gap by performing such an analysis and reporting our
ﬁndings based on a large dataset. The main contributions of
this paper are:
• We extensively provide evidence that malware labelling
is not a precise science. Applications are ﬂagged or not
depending on the antivirus product;
• We show that most malware writers basically
copy/paste code from fellow developer code and from
public tutorials/samples from the Web;
• We ﬁnd that malware writing is almost a regular
business, with work cycles following a similar 5
working days per week;
• We also highlight that almost all malware writers are
incapable to properly use digital certiﬁcates;
• Finally, we propose roadmaps for basic detection of
malware that have not yet been detected by antivirus
products.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides
detailed information on the construction of our dataset
of Android applications, and on the labelling process to
categorize benign and malware applications. Section III
depicts the main ﬁndings of our experimental analysis. We
also provide a discussion to guide this analysis. We discuss
related work in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper
and outlines future work.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
An investigation into the business of malware requires
a signiﬁcant dataset representing real-world applications.
We have built our dataset by collecting applications from
markets, i.e., the online stores where developers distribute
their applications to end-users. Indeed, although Google –the
main developer of the Android software stack– operates an
ofﬁcial market named Google Play, the policy of Google
makes it possible for Android users to download and install
Apps from any other alternative market.
Alternative markets are often created to distribute speciﬁc
selection of applications. For example, some of these
markets may focus on a speciﬁc geographical area, e.g.,
Russia or China, providing users with Apps in their local
languages. Other markets focus exclusively on free software,
and at least one market is known to be dedicated to adult
content. Users may also directly share Apps, either in
close circles, or with application bundles released through
BitTorrent. Such apps are often distributed by other users
who have paid for them in non-free markets. Finally, we
have included in our datasets, apps that have been collected
by others to construct research repositories.
In the remainder of this section, we provide details on the
different sources of our dataset, on the scanning process that
were used to label each application as malware or benign,
and on the artifacts that we have extracted from application
packages to perform our study.
A. Dataset sources
We have developed specialized crawlers for several market
places to automatically browse their content, ﬁnd Android
applications that could be retrieved for free, and download
them into our repository. In this step we have found that
several market owners took various steps in order to prevent
their market to be automatically mined. Thus, for two of
such markets, we cannot assure that we have retrieved their
whole content. However, to the best of our knowledge, the
total number of apps that we have collected constitutes the
largest dataset of Android apps ever used in research studies.
Google Play1: The ofﬁcial market of Android is a
web-site that allows users to browse its content through a
web browser. Applications cannot however be downloaded
through the web browser as any other ﬁle would be.
Instead, Google provides an Android application2 that uses
a proprietary protocol to communicate with Google Play
servers. Furthermore, no application can be downloaded
from Google Play without a valid Google account – not even
free Apps. Both issues thus outlined were overcome using
open-source implementations of the proprietary protocol and
by creating free Google accounts. The remaining constraint
was time, as Google also enforces a strict account-level
rate-limiting. Indeed, one given account is not allowed to
1 http://play.google.com (previously known as Google Market) 2 Also
named Google Play
download more than a given quantity of application in a
given time frame.
AppChina3: This market is by far the largest alternative
market of our dataset. At the time of collection, AppChina
was enforcing drastic scraping protections such as a 1Mb/s
bandwidth limitation and a several-hour ban if using
simultaneously more than one connection to the service.
Anzhi4: The anzhi market is operated from and for
Chinese Android user base. It stores and distributes apps
that are written in the Chinese languages, and provides a
less-strict screening policy than e.g., Google Play.
Slideme5: Operated from the United States of America.
this alternative market is a direct competitor of Google Play:
it provides both free and paid Apps for the Android platform.
FreewareLovers6: A market run by a German
company, FreewareLovers provides freeware for every major
mobile platform, including Android. A big advantage of
FreewareLovers is that it does not require any speciﬁc
application and can be used with any web browser.
ProAndroid7: Operated from Russia, ProAndroid
market is the smallest market that we crawled. It distributes
free Apps only.
F-Droid8: This repository of Free and open-source
software on the Android platform also provides a number
of apps that users can download and install on their devices.
1mobile9: This market proposes free Android apps for
direct downloads. It is a very large market that offers users
with opportunities of browsing and retrieving thousands of
apps.
In addition to market places, we also looked into other
distribution channels to collect applications that are shared
by bundles.
Torrents: We have collected a small set of apps which
were made available through BitTorrent. We note that such
applications are usually distributed without their authors’
consent, and often include paid Apps. Nevertheless, when
considering the number of leeches, we were able to notice
that such collections of Android applications appear to
attract a signiﬁcant number of user downloads, increasing
the interest for investigating malware distributed in such
channels.
Genome10: Zhou et al. [25] have collected Android
malware samples and gave the research community access
to their built dataset. This dataset is divided in families, each
containing malware that are closely related to each other.
Table I summarizes the number of applications collected
from each market used to build our dataset. The largest share
of applications are from the ofﬁcial Android market, Google
Play. Using the SHA256 hash function on applications, we
noticed that several thousands applications are found in more
3 http://www.appchina.com 4 http://www.anzhi.com
5 http://slideme.org 6 http://www.freewarelovers.com
7 http://proandroid.net 8 http://f-droid.org/ 9 market.1mobile.com
10 http://www.malgenomeproject.org/
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than one market. Hence, the total number of unique apps in
Table I is less than the sum of unique applications in each
market.
Table I
ORIGIN OF THE ANDROID APPS IN OUR DATASET
Marketplace # of Android apps Percentage
Google Play 325 214 54.73%
appchina 125 248 21.13%
anzhi 76 414 12.86%
1mobile 57 506 9.68%
slideme 27 274 4.68%
torrents 5 294 0.89%
freewarelovers 4 145 0.70%
proandroid 3 683 0.62%
fdroid 2 023 0.34%
genome 1 247 0.21%
apk_bang 363 0.06%
Total 594 000 Unique apps
B. Artifacts of study
To perform our study we have mined information from
the application packages focusing on two artifact metadata
in Android package ﬁles.
Packaging dates: An Android application is distributed
as an .apk ﬁle which is actually a ZIP archive containing
all the resources an application needs to run, such as
the application binary code and images. An interesting
side-effect of this package format is that all the ﬁles that
makes an application go from the developer’s computer to
end-users’ devices without any modiﬁcation. In particular,
all metadata of the ﬁles contained in the .apk package,
such as the last modiﬁcation date, are preserved.
All bytecode, representing the application binary code, is
assembled into a classes.dex ﬁle that is produced at
packaging-time. Thus the last modiﬁcation date of this ﬁle
represents the packaging time. In the remainder of this paper,
packaging date will refer to this date.
Certiﬁcate Metadata: In the Android platform, a ﬁrst
security measure was made mandatory to guarantee that the
authenticity of each application can be traced back to its
creator. Thus, all Android applications must be signed with a
cryptographic certiﬁcate. Certiﬁcates are included in the app
package to allow end-users to verify the package’s signature.
For each application from our dataset, we have collected the
certiﬁcates and analyzed their attributes, including owner
and issuer, as described by the X.509 standard [18].
C. Malware Labelling
Over the course of several months, while we collect
the dataset, we have undertaken to analyze them with anti
virus products actually used in the software market. For our
study, we have relied on VirusTotal11, a web portal that
hosts about 40 products from renown anti virus vendors,
11 http://www.virustotal.com
including McAfee, Symantec or Avast. We have sent
all applications from our dataset to VirusTotal and collected
the scan results for analysis and correlation studies.
D. Test of Statistical Signiﬁcance
Our forensics analysis is based on a sample of Android
applications. Although, to the best of our knowledge, no
related study involving Android malware has ever exploited
that many applications, there is a need to ensure, for some
of our ﬁndings, that they are signiﬁcant. To this end, we
resort to the common metric of the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
(MWW) test.
The MWW test is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis
test that assesses the statistical signiﬁcance of the difference
between the distributions in two datasets [19]. We adopt
this test as it does not assume any speciﬁc distribution,
a suitable property for our experimental setting. Once the
Mann-Whitney U value is computed it is used to determine
the p-value. Given a signiﬁcance level α = 0.001, if
p − value < α, then the test rejects the null hypothesis,
implying that the two datasets have different distributions at
the signiﬁcance level of α = 0.001: there is one chance in
a thousand that this is due to a coincidence.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe and interpret the results of our
ﬁndings on how malware are written, in comparison with
benign applications, and how anti virus products perform in
their detection.
A. Malware identiﬁcation by anti virus products
Malware identiﬁcation by anti virus products is critical
to practitioners and researchers alike. Indeed, anti virus
products remain the most trusted means to ﬂag an
application as malware. Traditionally, the common detection
scheme of anti virus is signature-based. Thus, to identify
malware statically, antivirus software compares the contents
of application ﬁles to their secret dictionary of virus
signatures. This approach can be very effective, but can only
help identify malware for which samples have already been
obtained and associated signatures created. Some antivirus
products add heuristics to their process in order to identify
new malware or variants of known malware.
In Figure 1, we see that most of our data sources contain
Android applications that are ﬂagged as malware by at least
1 anti virus product hosted by VirusTotal. Even Google Play,
where each application goes through the Bouncer12, shows a
malware-rate of 22%. These malware are often in the form of
adware, i.e., applications that continuously display undesired
advertisement during use. Anzhi and AppChina include the
largest share of ﬂagged applications. Each of all the malware
samples from the Genome dataset are indeed ﬂagged by at
least one anti virus software.
12 Google’s in-house environment for screening malware
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Figure 1. Share of Malware in Datasets: Applications are ﬂagged by at least 1 antivirus product
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Figure 2. Share of Malware in Datasets: Applications are ﬂagged by at least 10 antivirus products
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Figure 3. Share of Malware in Datasets: Applications are ﬂagged by at least 26 antivirus products
Malware shares depicted in Figure 2 indicate that anti
virus software have divergent scanning results. Indeed, if
we require that an application should be tagged as a
malware only if at least 10 anti virus products have found
it suspicious, then the malware rate drops signiﬁcantly for
all our data sources. Google Play now only contains 2% of
malware, while all Genome samples are still identiﬁed as
true malware.
The Genome dataset being a reliable source of known
malware, we change the threshold of anti virus until some
of the applications in the dataset are missed in the scanning
process. Figure 3 provides the different malware share when
at least 26 anti virus, out of more than 40, are required to
ﬂag an application before it is considered a malware.
Anti virus software cannot each identify all existing
malware. Only a small subset of widely known
malware are recognized by a large number of anti
virus software.
B. Android Malware Production
We proceed to investigate the production of Android
malware to draw insights. The analysis of packaging dates
of Android applications yields some distinct patterns. In
Figure 4, we plot the packaging date, subdivided by hour,
for benign applications and for all applications ﬂagged by
at least one anti virus. Despite the potential noise due to the
threshold set by each anti virus to tag malware, we note a
pattern in the compilation dates: it stands out that there are
many more peaks of malware packaging. This suggests that
malware often are compiled in batches, while compilation
of benign applications are more spread over time.
To further investigate and strengthen the validity of our
ﬁnding, we consider the samples of conﬁrmed malware from
known families exposed in the Genome dataset, and consider
all other applications from our datasets as benign. This
process is valid when considering a very strict threshold
where an application is labelled as malware if at least half,
i.e., 22, of the anti virus software from VirusTotal ﬂag it.
Figure 5 thus conﬁrms more strongly that Android malware
are compiled in batches. The 1258 malware of the genome
dataset have been packaged on only 244 different days. 51
malware were packaged on 2011-09-21 alone, representing
16% of all Android apps packaged on this day. Only 72
malware were packaged each alone in a distinct day when
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Figure 5. Number of packaged application and of packaged malware over
time: Focus on period 2011-06-01 to 2011-06-17
no other malware was packaged. We counted 78 cases where
at least two malware were packaged in the same second.
At 15 instances, four or more malware were packaged in
the same second; Two of those instances saw ten or more
new malware being packaged. Such a strong time locality
suggests that malware writers have set up tools to automate
the malware packaging process. One single certiﬁcate (md5:
264BF7D71E0EDC4FCB8A9A16AB7C3357) even managed
to sign 781 apps detected as malware by at least one anti
virus in the same second (2012-01-07 14:25:06).
Malware development is often a standardized process
that aims at producing a large number of malware
at once. Aside from rare cases of target-specialized
malware, malware are built in bulk in the like of
slightly different applications.
C. Business of Malware Writing
We now look into the process of malware writing. We
focus our analysis on their apparition cycles by clustering
Android applications based on the week day during which
they were packaged. For this experiment, we only consider
malware that were detected by at least half of the anti virus
software operated by VirusTotal.
Table II highlights the distribution of app packaging dates
for both benign applications and malware across week days.
The percentage of apps packaged during business days are
actually similar for malware and benign applications. A test
of signiﬁcance with the MWW test further conﬁrms that the
statistical difference is near null.
On average, 19% of benign applications are packaged
during weekends, while this is the case for only 13% of
malware. We further use the MWW test to conﬁrm that
the difference between weekdays and week-end days is
statistically more signiﬁcant for malware than for benign.
There is thus a clear pattern of ﬁve-day work per week. A
possible explanation to this pattern could be that malware
writing is performed by some developers during their regular
ofﬁce hours while working for their employer. A second
reason might be that malware writers follow a standard work
schedule and do not work during weekends, thus suggesting
an industrial process in the building of malware rather than
a spare-time hobby.
There appear to be evidence that the business of
malware writing, or at least their proliferation, is at
an industrial scale.
D. Digital Certiﬁcates
Android applications rely on digital certiﬁcates to build a
trust model between developers and end users. Applications
signed using the same certiﬁcate can share information
and data at runtime (if allowed by explicit permissions).
Certiﬁcates also allow to link a set of applications with
their developer, although this linking does not ensure that
the identity of a developer is certiﬁed. Indeed, certiﬁcates
can be self-signed, rather than signed by a competent
trustworthy authority, and therefore do not necessary lead
to the real developer. However, ﬁnding the same certiﬁcate
(serial number, ﬁngerprint , issuer and owner) in several
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Table II
DISTRIBUTION OF ANDROID PACKAGING DATES ACROSS WEEK DAYS
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Benign Apps 56,476 15.75% 57,728 16.10% 58,078 16.20% 58,995 16.45% 58,926 16.43% 34,223 9.54% 34,182 9.53%
Malware (Threshold=24) 236 14.68% 376 23.38% 284 17.66% 276 17.16% 225 13.99% 90 5.60% 121 7.52%
Malware (Threshold=25) 211 14.46% 342 23.44% 265 18.16% 254 17.41% 205 14.05% 81 5.55% 101 6.92%
Malware (Threshold=26) 200 14.60% 328 23.94% 249 18.18% 234 17.08% 190 13.87% 74 5.40% 95 6.93%
applications is a strong indicator of either a unique origin,
or of advanced certiﬁcate stealing and reuse.
Our analysis on certiﬁcates aims at understanding the
practice of certiﬁcate use by malware writers. We ﬁrst note,
based on our datasets, that self-signed certiﬁcates are the
norm rather than the exception for Android developers.
Of the 165 542 certiﬁcates in our dataset, only 51 are
not self-signed. Self-signed certiﬁcates were used to sign
99.88% of the apps in our dataset. Consequently, most
certiﬁcates carry no information that could be trusted about
the identity of the application developer.
Our ﬁndings apply particularly to malware development.
We focus our study on the subset of malware in the Genome
dataset. These are well established malware that most anti
virus products can identify. For instance, the certiﬁcate
that holds the serial number E6EFD52A17E0DCE7 was
used in at least two different malware applications. Manual
searching for the Issuer-related ﬁelds13 does lead to the
blog of a well known Android developer. One entry of this
blog addressed the issue of signing of Android applications.
After reading this entry, we found out that writers of the
referred malware just copy/pasted the command in the
posted example without any effort to change the basic
information that indicates what a certiﬁcate is supposed to
certify.
We have further investigated this copy/paste strategy and
found that it occurs too often. Thus, although a certiﬁcate
issued to Android Debug can be used to develop and test
an application, the release version cannot be published with
such a certiﬁcate. This basic rule is stated in almost every
online tutorial and Android textbook. Yet, we identiﬁed more
than 50 well-known malware which use such a certiﬁcate:
this questions the competency or may highlight the laziness
of malware writers as in a day-to-day job.
Finally, our manual investigation into the attributes of
certiﬁcates in malware, reveal that, sometimes, malware
writers brag or use obvious offensive names. For instance, a
certiﬁcate whose owner is named PhoneSniper appears in at
least 281 different malware. If users were able to carefully
inspect certiﬁcates before installation, such malware would
have been less propagated. Similarly, this information could
be used with techniques of natural language processing to
silently ﬁlter some malware in application markets.
The vast majority of Android apps in our datasets are
signed with a certiﬁcate that was used to sign very few
13 Issuer: C=ID, ST=Jawa Barat, L=Bandung,
O=Londatiga, OU=AndroidDev, CN=Lorensius W. L.
T/emailAddress=lorenz@londatiga.net
other applications. Indeed, we have found that 95% of
the certiﬁcates signed less than 10 apps. However, for the
remainder of certiﬁcates that were used in large numbers of
applications, different patterns emerge.
Table III summarizes the top certiﬁcates used in
malware packages. Once again, we consider as malware
all applications that were ﬂagged as suspicious by at least
half of the anti virus products in VirusTotal. The numbers
distinctly provide evidence that there a mass development
and deployment of Android benign and malware apps was
put in place. For instance, three certiﬁcates were used each
for more than 160 malware. The top-used certiﬁcate by
malware is also used by over 4 623 benign applications: a
realistic hypothesis to support this fact would be that the
private key was somehow leaked, leading to many otherwise
unrelated writers to use and share the same certiﬁcate.
We further consider the overlap between benign and
malicious applications that share the same certiﬁcate. In
Table IV, we indicate the top certiﬁcates that are used by
both malware and goodware. We note that there is a clear
overlap showing the usage of certiﬁcates for both malicious
and benign applications. A number of explanations can be
provided for this phenomenon:
• Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde syndrome. Developers use
the same development tools and environment for both
legitimate and malicious applications. This observation
supports the 5 working day behavior shown in table II.
This means that developers write malware during their
regular working hours.
• Reputation biasing. In this hypothesis, a developer
might increase her/his reputation by developing benign
applications. As soon as enough positive reviews
have been obtained, successive malware might be
more easily downloaded and installed. For instance,
the certiﬁcate with the serial 4DFF5300, has been
observed signing both a malicious and a non malicious
application on 2011-08-30, in the very same time:
21:52:38. On the overall 1 benign application and 176
malware are associated with this certiﬁcate. The most
recent application in our dataset using this certiﬁcate
was packaged on 2012-03-11 17:19:54, while its ﬁrst
usage can be traced back to 2011-07-14 21:45:12.
• Anti virus false negatives. Probably, some of the
applications tagged as benign are in fact malicious. It is
possible that existing tools have not detected them yet
as malicious, due to a better obfuscation and stealthier
behavior.
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Table III
TOP 20 CERTIFICATES WHICH WERE USED TO SIGN THE MOST MALWARE
Certiﬁcate MD5 Number of Benign Number of Malware Certiﬁcate Issuer & Owner
E8. . . 87 4 623 192 C=US, ST=California, L=Mountain View, O=Android, OU=Android,CN=Android/emailAddress=android@android.com
E5. . . 3F 0 167 C=keji0003
CF. . . 26 1 166 C=cn, ST=shenzhen, L=china, O=Phone, OU=Phone, CN=PhoneSniper
50. . . BA 0 98 C=kejikeji, ST=kejikeji, L=kejikeji, O=kejikeji, OU=kejikeji, CN=kejikeji
E5. . . C2 0 95 C=US, OU=Google Inc.
8B. . .D2 0 52 CN=Fujian Kaimo Network Tech
3C. . . 3E 0 29 C=a, ST=a, L=a, O=a, OU=a, CN=a
AC. . .A7 1 21 CN=Sexy
C4. . . 2B 0 20 C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Typ3 Studios, OU=Typ3 Studios, CN=Typ3 Studios
CF. . . 6C 0 19 C=0
1D. . . 07 6 17 C=CN, ST=Sichuan, L=Chengdu, O=jiemai-tech, OU=jiemai-tech, CN=Jiemai Technology
77. . . F3 8 17 CN=alan
B1. . .A4 0 17 OU=Safe System Inc., CN=Safe System Inc.
74. . . 50 0 16 C=cn, ST=guangdong, L=shenzhen, O=hynoo, OU=hynoo, CN=wang
21. . . 37 2 15 C=cn, ST=fujian, L=xiamen, O=guopai, OU=guopai, CN=jtwang
76. . .A8 1 14 C=CN, CN=picshow1
AC. . . 94 0 13 C=86, ST=BeiJing, L=BeiJing, O=Gold Dream Studio, OU=Gold Dream Studio, CN=Hong Fu
73. . .A3 0 12 C=001, ST=US, L=LSA, O=www.android.com, OU=www.android.com, CN=Android
C6. . . 1B 0 12 C=86, ST=SH, L=CN, O=MJ, OU=MJ, CN=MJ
E7. . .AE 34 12 C=0086, ST=Beijing, L=Beijing, O=Gall me, OU=Android, CN=Gall me
Table IV
TOP 15 CERTIFICATES WHICH WERE USED TO SIGN MANY MALWARE AND WHICH SIGNED BENIGN APPS AS WELL
Certiﬁcate MD5 Number of Benign Number of Malware Certiﬁcate Issuer & Owner
E8. . . 87 4 623 192 C=US, ST=California, L=Mountain View, O=Android, OU=Android,CN=Android/emailAddress=android@android.com
1D. . . 07 6 17 C=CN, ST=Sichuan, L=Chengdu, O=jiemai-tech, OU=jiemai-tech, CN=Jiemai Technology
77. . . F3 8 17 CN=alan
21. . . 37 2 15 C=cn, ST=fujian, L=xiamen, O=guopai, OU=guopai, CN=jtwang
E7. . .AE 34 12 C=0086, ST=Beijing, L=Beijing, O=Gall me, OU=Android, CN=Gall me
8D. . . F9 92 10 C=US, ST=California, L=Mountain View, O=Android, OU=Android,CN=Android/emailAddress=android@android.com
DE. . . 92 3 9 C=CN, ST=Guangdong, L=Guangzhou, O=synkay, OU=sunkay, CN=sunkay
C7. . . 80 56 8 C=US, ST=Fl, L=Miami, O=Gp Imports, OU=Gp Imports, CN=Gp Imports
69. . . A5 87 7 C=CN, ST=beijing, L=beijing, O=Wali, OU=Wali, CN=Lee
34. . . F5 2 6 C=KR, ST=South Korea, L=Suwon City, O=Samsung Corporation,OU=DMC, CN=Samsung Cert/emailAddress=android.os@samsung.com
3D. . . 10 6 4 CN=Ngan Viet Dung
BA. . . 26 48 3 C=CN, ST=Zhejiang, L=Hangzhou, O=Feelingtouch, OU=Feelingtouch, CN=Feelingtouch
82. . . C5 2 3 C=86, ST=china, L=ysler, O=ysler, OU=ysler, CN=ysler.com
59. . . EE 178 2 C=86, ST=Guangdong, L=Guangzhou, O=3g.cn, OU=GAU, CN=Jarod Yv
51. . . B3 7 2 C=CN, ST=ShenZhen, L=ShenZhen, O=nmting.com, OU=nmting.com, CN=Ale Zhao
• Anti virus false positives. Anti virus can also
wrongly ﬂag a benign application as malware.
For instance the digital certiﬁcate whose md5
is 75BDB3531C04EB8246846532A7AE2050 has been
observed to sign 2 844 total applications, only one (1)
of which being tagged as malicious. In this case, we
suspect that either the certiﬁcate was stolen, but using
it for only one single malicious application does not
really make sense. More probable is the hypothesis that
the single malicious application is a false positive. We
have correlated this information also with the time-line
of the packaging dates for this certiﬁcate. The single
malicious application was packaged on 2013-11-15
19:16:04; On this very same day, this certiﬁcate signed
55 other apps that are all undetected by anti virus
products. The usage pattern for this certiﬁcate shows
very frequent application signing, often with just a
few minutes between two apps, and the application
detected as a malware exhibits no deviation from this
pattern. Furthermore, it would make sense for the
developer to create a new certiﬁcate if he once wrote a
malware, in order to avoid having his/her future benign
applications signed with a certiﬁcate that is associated
with a malware.
Malware writers do not use digital certiﬁcates
properly, and often reuse compromised keys that were
used to build certiﬁcates of benign applications.
IV. DISCUSSION
The forensic analysis that we have performed and whose
results were outlined in the previous section has yielded a
number of insights for the research and practice of malware
detection. In this section, we summarize these insights and
discuss how this empirical study could be instrumented in
our work on malware detection.
A. Summary of ﬁndings
On Anti virus software: Our large-scale analysis of
hundreds of thousands of Android applications with over
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40 anti virus products have revealed that most malware are
not simultaneously identiﬁed by several anti virus. Only a
small subset of common malware is detected by most anti
virus software. This ﬁnding actually supports the idea that
there is a need to invest in alternative tools for malware
detection such as machine-learning based approaches which
are promising to ﬂag more malware variants.
On malware business: We have presented empirical
evidence that malware were mass produced. This raises
a number of questions leading to hypothesis on how
malware developers manage to remain productive. The ﬁrst
hypothesis would be that, malware is not written from
scratch, thus providing an opportunity to detect malware by
discovering the piece of code that was grafted to existing,
potentially popular, apps.
B. Insights
Building a naive anti virus software: Exploring the
rate of shared certiﬁcates within malware, we were able to
devise a naive malware detection mechanism based on the
appearance of a tagged certiﬁcate. In its simplest form, the
scheme consists in tagging any application as malicious if
the signing key has been already observed for a conﬁrmed
malicious application.
To assess this naive approach we have considered that
in a ﬁrst phase we have manually discovered all malware
packaged before 01/Jan/2013 in our dataset. We consider for
this step only malware that are detected by at least half of the
anti virus products. Then based on the certiﬁcates recorded
for the found malware, we arbitrarily tag as malicious all
applications packaged after 01/Jan/2013 and that are signed
with any of the ﬂagged certiﬁcates. Table V provides the
results for this experiment. We were able to build a malware
detector with a Precision of 84% (2, 166 false positives out
of 2, 166 + 11, 460 tagged). While we succeed in ﬂagging
almost 1 actual malware out of 10, we only wrongly tag as
malicious about 1 benign app in 100.
Table V
PERFORMANCE OF A NAIVE ANTI VIRUS SOFTWARE BASED ON
CERTIFICATES
Benign apps tagged Malware tagged
Number 2 166 11 460
Percentage 1.19% 8.82%
At the minimum, the obtained results show that our naive
approach could be used by anti virus vendors to improve
their recall, by being suspicious of more apps, and improve
precision by trusting apps signed with certiﬁcates that have
been used in a large number of benign apps.
Localizing malware: Our ﬁndings on the potential mass
production of malware could be leveraged in an approach
of malware localization. Indeed, simultaneous development
and packaging of malware suggests a redundant insertion of
malware code in all applications. Thus, a similarity measure
of the bytecode could allow to isolate this code and then
locate it in other malware samples.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we enumerate a number of related
work to emphasize on the importance of understanding
the development of malware in order to devise efﬁcient
techniques for their detection. These related work span from
empirical studies on on datasets of malware, to malware
detection schemes.
A. Malicious datasets analysis
Researchers have already shown interest in malicious
application datasets analysis. Felt et al. have analyzed
several instances of malware deployed on various mobile
platforms such as iOS, Android and Symbian [15]. They
detail the wide range of incentives for malware writing, such
as users’ personal information and credentials exﬁltration,
ransom attack and the easiest way to proﬁt from smartphone
malware, premium-rate SMS services. Their study is
however qualitative, while we have focused on a quantitative
study to draw generalizable ﬁndings on common patterns.
The Genome dataset, our source of well-established
malware, was built as part of a study by Zhou et al. [25].
They expose in details features and incentives of the current
malware threat on Android. They also suggest that existing
anti virus software still need improvements. Our analysis
also comes to this conclusion when we demonstrate that
most malware cannot be found by all anti virus products.
Opposite to our lightweight forensic analysis approach,
Enck et al. [13] did an in-depth analysis of Android
applications by using advanced static analysis methods.
Doing so, they were able to discover some risky features
of the android framework that could be used by malicious
applications. However, our approach allowed to highlight
interesting patterns that are could be leveraged more easily.
In recent work [1], Allix et al. have devised a sophisticated
Feature set to use in a machine learning-based malware
detection for Android. This approach has however proved
to be resource-intensive, suggesting further investigations
into more straightforward features. The study detailed in
this paper is part of the roadmaps we have devised for our
investigations.
B. Dynamic analysis
Various solutions have been proposed to detect malicious
Android applications. Crowdroid, presented by Burguera et
al. [8], performs dynamic analysis of Android applications
by ﬁrst collecting system calls patterns of applications,
and then applying clustering algorithms to discriminate
benign from suspicious behaviors. Crowdroid strongly rely
on crowd sourcing for system calls patterns collection.
Vidas and Christin has investigated applications from
alternative markets and compared them to applications from
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the ofﬁcial market [22]. They have found that certain
alternative markets almost exclusively distribute repackaged
applications containing malware. They have proceeded
to propose AppIntegrity to strengthen the authentication
properties offered in application marketplaces. Our ﬁndings
are in line with those, when we note that malware seem
to be mass produced, and that the same certiﬁcates overlap
between malware and benign applications.
C. Similarity and Heuristics based malware detection
In order to detect repackaged applications, which malware
authors often do to embed their malicious payloads, Zhou
et al. [23] presented DroidMOSS. Their approach consists
in building a signature of the whole application by using a
fuzzy hashing technique on the application’s opcodes. Then
a similarity score is computed for all Apps of a reference
dataset, thus concluding to the detection of rep if a similarity
score is higher than a given threshold
DroidRanger presented by Zhou et al. [24] tries to detect
suspicious applications by ﬁrst performing a fast ﬁltering
step based on permissions requested by an application.
It then analyze the application code structure, as well
as other properties of applications. Finally, an heuristics
based detection engine is run with the data gathered about
applications. With this approach, the authors were able to
ﬁnd malware on the ofﬁcial Android market but also two
zero-day malware.
Regarding information leakage detection, Zhou et al. also
proposed TISSA [26] allowing an end-user to have a ﬁne
grained control of the access to her personal data.
D. On device mitigation
The topic of embedded mitigation solution was covered
by a wide range of previous works.
XManDroid [7] provides a mechanism capable of
analyzing Inter Process Communications and decide if
connections between applications are compliant with the
system policy. This full dynamic solution addresses the
problem of application level privilege escalation introduced
in [10].
DroidChecker [9] attends to address the same issue by
tracking permissions from the manifest ﬁles until their
utilization within the application. To achieve this, Chan et al.
proposed the use of control ﬂow graphs and taint checking
techniques.
Apex [20] proposes an extension to the Android
permission manager allowing users to customize permissions
owned by applications.
Kirin [14] extends the package installer and analyze
permissions before installation. It embeds security rules
based on permissions sets and can prevent a program from
being installed according to the permissions it requests. A
similar approach has been presented in [3].
Enck et al. introduced Taintdroid [12] which uses taint
analysis techniques to detect sensitive data leaks and warn
the end-user by showing him/her with relevant information.
In [17], authors have also studied data leaks. Hornyack
et al. present a framework capable of shadowing sensitive
user data and of blocking outgoing connexion implying data
leaked.
E. Miscellaneous approaches
An offensive framework was presented in [16] which
embeds a broad range of available Android exploits such
as Rage Against The Cage, known to overﬂow the number
of processes allowed. In the wild, this exploit is used by
various malware. The framework is able to run arbitrary root
exploit and to maintain privileges among reboots.
Rootkits possibilities on smartphones are exposed in [5],
showing that smartphones are as vulnerable as desktop
computers. The most valuable incentive to deploy rootkits
on smartphones would be the interesting personal data such
as voice communications and location.
With Androguard14, Desnos et al. provide a tool
to decompile Android applications and perform code
analyses [11]. Built on top of these features, Androguard
also provides a way to detect a large selection of malware,
and to measure the similarity of two applications, to detect
repackaging for instance.
Finally, concerning the detection of private data leaks,
static analysis tools [4], [21], including taint analysis [2],
have been proposed to deal with the speciﬁcities of Android.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent and steady rise of Android malware over the
past four years has lead to a rapidly growing automation
in the malware creation process. Due to the speciﬁc
nature of development of Android applications, important
artifacts leak out and can provide some insights about their
creators. We have analyzed the available data through this
perspective. For our large-scale study, we have considered
over 500,000 Android applications, which included both
benign applications and malware.
Packaging dates show substantial time localization
behavior. Waves of packaging can be observed thus shedding
a new light on the malware creation process. Digital
certiﬁcates, albeit self-signed also provide valuable pieces of
information. We have observed huge quantities of malware
sharing the same private key and thus proving that either
keys have been stolen, or those malware have the same
origin. On the other hand massive copy/paste coding, relying
on directly copying code from popular tutorials and blogs,
shows that the malware programming is done at a fast pace
by developers lacking elementary cryptography knowledge.
This, unfortunately shows that current Android malware
as well as mitigation techniques are still in the infancy.
14 http://code.google.com/p/androguard/
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It’s surprising to see that most malware writers do not use
digital certiﬁcates properly and that many of the current
mitigation techniques did not check them. However, more
troubling is the extent to which private keys seem to have
been compromised and that both benign applications and
malware share the same certiﬁcates.
In the future, we plan to leverage the insights discussed
in Section IV. Furthermore, we plan to extend this work
by considering also the automated analysis of the bytecode.
Some preliminary work have been done and the results are
promising.
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